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Mexico is a country of contrasts and disparities from economic, social, environmental and 
cultural viewpoints. With time, economic and social inequities have become increasingly more 
acute among the regions. While there are people with access to education, health, water, 
electricity, roads, infrastructural services, etc., there are many others who lack access even to the 
most basic services. 
 
In terms of water resources, there is an enormous imbalance between water availability and its 
use. The main economic activities are concentrated in the central, northern and northwestern 
regions of the country, representing approximately 84 percent of the GDP, but with a per capita 
water availability of only 2,044 m
3/year. On the other hand, in the southeastern part of the 
country, where water availability is 14,291m
3/year/per capita, accounts for only 16 percent of the 
GDP is produced. This region has the highest rates of poverty in the country and lack most type 
of infrastructural development (Chiapas, Oaxaca or Guerrero states) (OECD, 2003, 2002a, CNA, 
2005) (see Figure 1). This means that in the regions endowed with more natural resources, water 
included, poverty is more acute due to an unfortunate combination of lack of appropriate policies 
and institutions, which, among other issues, have affected negatively the quality of life of the 
local populations and the environment they live in.   
 
At the beginning of the 20
th century, approximately 80 percent of the population in Mexico lived 
in settlements having less than 2,500 people. However, by 2000, 60 percent of the population 
lived in settlements with more than 15,000 people (see Figure 2). The increase in concentration 
of population in urban and peri-urban areas, many of them under conditions of extreme poverty, 
has resulted in increased pollution and other stress on water resources and infrastructure.  
                                                           
1 The author acknowledges the help of Dr. Germán Martínez-Santoyo, Director General of the Water System of 
Mexico City (Sistema de Aguas de la Ciudad de México) for the preparation of the paper. Dr. Juan Manuel 
Anguiano-Lozada, Head, Deep Sewerage, Water System of Mexico City, and Dr. Nancy Contreras-Moreno, 
Professor, National Autonomous University of Mexico, provided invaluable support and insightful comments on this 
paper. The support of Dr. Yosu Rodríguez-Aldabe, Advisor to the Director General, CentroGEO “Ing. Jorge L. 
Tamayo,” National Research Council for Science and Technology, is also acknowledged. CentroGEO prepared 
several figures specifically for this analysis.  
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Approximately 30 million people currently live in settlements having less than 2,500 people. 
These heavily marginalized areas have low economic productivity, high unemployment and 
emigration rates, and poor access to services like education, health, clean water and sanitation. 
Malnutrition, low life expectancy and high mortality rate are also the highest in these areas 
(OECD, 2002b).  
 
In 2005, in terms of water-related services, 89.8 percent of the population at the national level 
had access to drinking water and 77.6 percent to sewerage. However, more than 11 million 
people still lack access to drinking water and over 22 million do not have access to adequate 
sanitation with the rural areas generally lagging behind in terms of having adequate services 
(Gobierno Federal, 2005). Coverage of water supply, in the present context, refers to the 
population that have access to piped water in their houses or their properties, and to the 
population able to obtain water from other houses, properties, or from a public source. In terms 
of sanitation, the Mexican statistics include population connected to a public sewer and septic 
tank, and those discharging wastes directly to rivers, lakes or ravines. Data are not available on 
either quality or reliability of the services received. 
 
 
Figure 1. Gross Domestic Product for the different states of Mexico 
Source: OECD, Economic Survey, Paris, 2002a 
















































Figure 2. Population distribution in Mexico, 2000 
Source: OCDE, Territorial Review for Mexico, Paris, 2002b 
 
 
The increased urbanisation and high population growth within the City and the neighbouring 
State of Mexico, resulted in the designation of an area known as Mexico City Metropolitan Area 
(ZMCM, by its acronym in Spanish). This metropolitan area, with an approximate population of 
20 million inhabitants and industries, services and commercial activities that generate 33.2 
percent of the GDP, plays very important roles in the country, both from economic and political 
viewpoints (SEMARNAT/CNA 2000). It faces, however, escalating demands for services in 
areas like water, sanitation, electricity, education and health, among others. 
 
 
MEXICO CITY METROPOLITAN AREA 
 
Mexico City is the capital of Mexico. It is located in the Federal District at 2,240 m above the 
mean sea level (msl) in the southwestern part of the Valley of Mexico. It is surrounded by 
mountains reaching a height of over 5,000 m above msl.  
 
At the beginning of the 20
th century, Mexico City was still in the north-central area of the 
Federal District. However, due to increased urbanisation, its 16 boroughs cover at present its 
entire surface area. In fact, according to the Mexican Constitution, the Mexico City is equal at 
  4present to Federal District, and both terms refer to the same location. 
 
At present, approximately 9 million people live in 60,203 ha of urban areas and 88,442 ha of 
rural or conservation areas (land that is left in its natural state, often for groundwater recharge) 
(see Figure 3). However, these figures do not represent the reality, since both rural and urban 





Figure 3. Conservation areas in the Federal District  
Source: Centro de Investigación en Geografía y Geomática “Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo”, Mexico. 
 
 
The Federal Government, and much of the industries, education and employment facilities and 
cultural centres of the country are concentrated in this area. However, the quality of life of the 
population living in the metropolitan area has decreased significantly in recent years, primarily 
because of increasing population density, and extensive air, noise and water pollution.  
 
In 1990, the ZMCM included the 16 boroughs of Mexico City and 27 municipalities of the 
neighbouring State of Mexico. In 1995, it was decided to include within the ZMCM the 
municipalities of the State of Mexico having the highest population as well as economic growth. 
At present, according to the National Council for Population (CONAPO, 2000), the metropolitan 
area includes the 16 boroughs mentioned above, 37 municipalities
2 of the State of Mexico and 
                                                           
2 These municipalities are the following: Acolman, Atenco, Atizapán de Zaragoza, Coacalco, Cocotitlán, Coyotepec, 
Chalco de Díaz Covarrubias, Chiautla, Chicoloapan, Chinconcuac, Chimalhuacán, Cuatitlán de Romero Rubio, 
Cuautitlán Izcalli, Ecatepec de Morelos, Huehuetoca, Huixquilucan, Ixtapaluca, Jaltenco, La Paz, Melchor Ocampo, 
Naucalpan de Juárez, Nextlalpan, Nezahualcóyotl, Nicolás Romero, San Martín de las Pirámides, Tecámac, 
  5one municipality of the neighbouring state of Hidalgo. However, according to the National 
Institute of Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI), the ZMCM includes the 16 boroughs 
of Mexico City and 34 municipalities of the State of Mexico. The INEGI definition will be used 
in this report. 
 
The ZMCM covers an area of 4,925 km
2 (1,484 km
2 in Mexico City, and 3,441 km
2 in the State 
of Mexico), representing about 0.25 percent of the national area. The population density varies 
from 13,500 to 131 persons/km
2. The State of Mexico is the most populated area in the country, 
with 13.1 million inhabitants, followed by Mexico City, with 8.6 million (INEGI, 2000a). The 
State of Mexico has also the highest population growth rate of all the states in the country, 
including the Federal District. During the 1990-2000 period, this state had an annual population 
growth rate of 2.9 percent, whereas the Federal District had an annual growth rate of 0.4 percent.  
   
The urban growth in the ZMCM has been very rapid and unorganised, which has resulted in 
acute environmental deterioration, including water and air. The rapidly increasing urban 
settlements continue invading what used to be protected land, and land use has changed from 
forestry to agricultural, and finally to urban. This uncontrolled growth in the ZMCM has 
progressed towards both the State of Mexico and to the rural areas of Mexico City (PNUMA et 
al., 2003).  
 
The expanding population, as well as the rapidly increasing industrial, services and commercial 
activities, have represented a formidable challenge for the institutions responsible for providing 
the necessary services, including water and sanitation, primarily in terms of management, 
investments and energy consumption. The investments have not only represented high economic 




HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF MEXICO CITY METROPOLITAN AREA
3
 
The water supply and wastewater systems in the metropolitan area, as well as in any other 
location, cannot be analysed without considering the associated human and geographical 
environment. They have to be considered in relation to issues such as geography, climate, 
population growth, urbanisation, migration, economic development and social expectations. In 
the case of the ZMCM, the evolution of the management of water and wastewater systems 
should be seen as an integral component of a rapidly expanding metropolitan area. Therefore, an 
overview of the changes that have occurred in the metropolitan area during the last 65 years will 
provide a better understanding of the water supply and sanitation situation in the region.  
 
In 1940, the Federal District had a population of 1.75 million people, out of which 1.6 million 
lived in the downtown area (what was then known as Mexico City and now includes 
Cuauhtémoc, Venustiano Carranza, Benito Juárez and Miguel Hidalgo boroughs). During this 
decade, the metropolitan area started to grow mainly as a result of increasing economic activities 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Temamatla, Teoloyucan, Teotihuacán, Tepotzotlán, Texcoco, Tezoyuca, Tlalnepantla, Tultepec, Tultitlán, Valle de 
Chalco, Solidaridad and Zumpango. 
3 This section is based mainly on information from National Population Council, Demographic and Urban Scenarios 
of the Metropolitan Area, Mexico, 2000.  
  6in the municipalities adjacent to the Federal District.  
 
In 1950, the metropolitan area included the then Mexico City, seven boroughs of the Federal 
District and two municipalities of the State of Mexico. The population was 2.9 million people, 
living in an urban area of 26,275 ha, with a population density of 113.5 people/ha. Population 
density was higher in the downtown area compared to the rest of the boroughs, which included 
mainly rural settlements (less than 2500 people).  
 
During this decade, Mexico City developed primarily towards the North reaching the limits of 
the State of Mexico. This resulted in increasing urban activities in both sides of the border, and 
industrial activities primarily in this state. The National Autonomous University of Mexico was 
established in the southern part of the City. This was followed by progressive urban development 
in this area, with middle- and high-income settlements as well as industrial activities. During this 
period, the government of Mexico City decided not to authorise any additional housing 
construction. This resulted in formal and informal urban developments in the State of Mexico. 
 
In 1960, the then metropolitan area included Mexico City, 15 boroughs of the Federal District 
and four municipalities in the State of Mexico. The population had increased to 5.1 million 
inhabitants within an urban area of 41,690 ha, which resulted in a population density of 123.66 
persons/ha. This was an increase of almost 73 percent in terms of population, and more than 58 
percent in urban area, in comparison with the situation in 1950. 
 
During this decade, Mexico City, as well as the metropolitan area, changed dramatically not only 
due to population growth, but also due to very rapid urban, road and industrial developments. 
There was an explosion of planned (high-rise buildings for low- and medium-income families) as 
well as unplanned settlements (in areas with very complex topography, mainly in Alvaro 
Obregón, Iztapalapa, Gustavo A. Madero and Coyoacán boroughs). Restrictions for construction 
of housing continued in the Federal District, which resulted in an increasing number of informal 
settlements in the City. 
 
In 1970, the metropolitan area included Mexico City, 16 boroughs of the Federal District and 11 
municipalities of the State of Mexico. Population had increased to 8.6 million inhabitants and the 
urban area had reached 72,246 ha. Massive urbanisation took place in Mexico City. The urban 
land used increased by 73 percent and seven municipalities were added to the metropolitan area, 
which reduced the population density to 120 persons/ha. This period witnessed a massive urban 
explosion of both formal and informal settlements within the overall ZMCM. 
 
In 1980, the population in the metropolitan area had increased to 13.7 million (59 percent in 
comparison to 1970) and the urban area by another 89,112 ha (23 percent) compared to 1970. 
The population density had increased to 154 persons/ha.  
 
Between 1980 and 1990, the population in the metropolitan area increased to 15 million people 
and the urban area covered a total of 40,390 ha (11,306 in the Federal District and 29,084 ha in 
the State of Mexico), with the highest urban growth in the State of Mexico. 
 
From 1950 to 1995, the population of Mexico City increased from 3 to 17 million people (Table 
1). In contrast to the previous decades, during the 1990-2000 period, the annual population 
  7growth of Mexico City was only 0.4 percent, compared to the ZMCM, which was 2.9 percent. 
The main reason for the growth in ZMCM was immigration from the rural areas and from the 
medium- and small-size cities.  
 
 
Table 1. Average population of Mexico City Metropolitan Area, 1950-1995 (millions) 
 
  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 
ZMCM  2,982,075 5,155,327 8,656,851 13,734,654  15,047,685  16,898,316 
Mexico  City  2,923,194 4,846,497 6,874,165 8,8831,079  8,235,744 8,489,007 
Source: Demographic and urban scenarios of the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City, 1990-2010. National 
Population Council, CONAPO, 2000. 
 
 
Throughout these decades, the population growth and the planned and unplanned urbanisation 
have resulted in an uneven race for the federal and the local governments to construct 
infrastructure and provide essential services to the population, including water supply and 
sanitation (Table 2). An example is the number of houses, which doubled in 50 years, with more 
than 1.7 million in 1990 in comparison to 600,000 in 1940.  
 
In addition to the explosive population growth, lack of planning, financial, managerial and 
human constraints, political interference have also contributed to increasing difficulties to 
provide the basic services to the people concerned. An important issue has been how to provide 
clean water, sanitation and electricity to the expanding urban, industrial and service sectors of the 
metropolitan area, with increasingly scarce resources, both financial and natural. 
 
 
Table 2. Houses with tap water and sewerage services in Mexico City, 1950-1990 
 
 1950  1960  1970  1980  1990 
 











































Source: SEN-DGE, VII Population Census, 1950; SPP-DGE, VIII and X Census  
of Population and Housing, 1980, 1990, 2000, in CONAPO 2000. 
 
 
The main sources of water for the City have been a combination of surface and groundwater. 
Due to the increasing population, the extraction of groundwater became a problem as early as the 
1940s, both due to increasing abstraction rates and resulting land subsidence. 
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In 1942, the Lerma Valley project was initiated to transfer water over a distance of 62 km to 
meet the increasing water demands of the metropolitan area. The first stage carried 4 m
3/s of 
water. With time, this volume became insufficient. Accordingly, during the 1970s and the 1980s, 
the Chichinautla system was constructed, the Xochimilco system was enlarged, and the volume 
from the Lerma River was further increased.  
 
By the 1980s, Mexico City had a supply of water of 50 m
3/s, out of which 76 percent was for 
Mexico City and the balance for the municipalities in the State of Mexico which are within the 
metropolitan area. Historically, water supply has favoured the population of Mexico City. In 
1990, even though 45 percent of the population in the metropolitan area was from the State of 
Mexico, they received only 35 percent of the water transported from the external sources. A 
higher percentage of the population in Mexico City has always received better services compared 
to the municipalities of the State of Mexico that have been within the metropolitan area. This 
gap, however, has been decreasing in recent years. The quality and reliability of the water and 
sewerage services varies, depending upon the physical locations of the houses as well as on the 
socio-economic level of the population. More people living in the high-income areas have access 
to services compared to those living in middle-class areas, and more than in the low-income 
areas.  
 
In terms of sewerage, topography and soil characteristics of the City have made the sewerage 
construction (used for stormwater and wastewater) a very difficult and expensive task. From 
1960, most of the budget for the city for public works was for the construction of the Deep 
Sewerage, which resulted in a larger number of houses receiving the service, from 44 percent in 
1960 to approximately 93 percent in 2000. 
 
Table 3 shows the access in the ZMCM to services such as electricity, water supply and 
sewerage. More people in Mexico City now have access to such services, compared to the 
municipalities in the State of Mexico that are part of the ZMCM. This is because Mexico City, 
being the capital of the country, is much more urbanised than the municipalities, and it has also 
more economic and political power.  
 
A large number of high-income houses are not connected to the public sewer because they have 
been constructed on volcanic rocks, which has made it difficult and expensive to build such 
infrastructure. This is especially the case for many settlements in the southern part of the city, 
most of which have septic tanks.  
 
Figures 4, 5 and 6 show the socio-economic conditions of the population living in the ZMCM, as 
well as in the areas that lack water and sewerage services. At present, no information is available 
for most of the municipalities in the State of Mexico, as well as most of the so-called 
conservation areas in Mexico City, even though there is an increasing number of people, mainly 
low-income, who continue to move into these areas.  
 
The quality and extent of the services available to the population depend mainly on the level of 
urbanisation of the areas where they live. Thus, people living in the urban areas have access to 
more services compared to the population in rural areas where the services are also less reliable. 
Information is mostly not available from rural areas. 
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Table 3. Access to services in the ZMCM in urban AGEB





Total  Downtown Municipalities  in 














Number of houses without  electricity    54,048 788  6,814  40,461 3,175 3,598  704  329 
Percentage of houses without electricity  1.8%  1.6%  2.7% 2.1% 0.7% 0.9% 1.1%  1.7% 
Number of houses without sewerage 545,836  2,247  96,010  398,218  23,707 17,122  8,532  3,249 
Percentage of houses without sewerage  17.6%  4.5%  38.5%  21.1% 5.1% 4.4%  13.5%  17.2% 
Number of houses without tap water  1,115,262 6,486  133,878  872,222 61,026 36,341  5,309  5,932 
Percentage of houses without tap water  35.9%  12.9%  53.5% 46.2% 13.2%  9.3%  7.8%  31.5% 
Number of private houses  2,147,341  24,075 189,214  1,256,228  375,017 257,919  44,888  9,996 
Number of rented houses  678,956  20,837  40,903 448,443  53,788 104,927  10,058  5,444 
Percentage of private houses  69.2%  48.0%  75.7% 66.5% 81.2% 65.8% 76.0%  53.1% 
Percentage of rented houses  21.9%  41.6  16.4% 23.7% 11.6% 26.7% 17.1%  28.9% 
 
1 Urban AGEB refers to geographical areas in settlements consisting of 2500 people or more (all municipalities are included even if population is less than 2500). Land use is for 
housing, industries, commercial, recreation or any other use, but not for agriculture, livestock or forest.  
 
Source: “Resultados definitivos. INEGI, Datos por AGEB Urbana, XI Censo General de Población y Vivienda 1990. Volúmenes del Distrito Federal, Estado de 




Figure 4. Socioeconomic levels of the population living in the ZMCM 
Source: Centro de Investigación en Geografía y Geomática “Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo”, Mexico. 
 
 
The socio-economic levels are defined according to the following parameters: 
 
•  percentage of population economically active, 
•  percentage of population 15 years or older, with at least primary school education, 
•  percentage of population earning at least five times the minimum wage per month, 
•  percentage of private houses, 
•  percentage of houses with tap water, and  
•  number of people per room living in private houses. 
 
Demographic and socio-economic conditions have a major influence on the overall urban 
growth, and land use depends on the social and economic conditions of the local population. 
About 67 percent of the population in the ZMCM can be considered to be in medium to low 
socio-economic level, about 15 percent are in high and medium to high, and 18 percent to the 
very low (PNUMA et al., 2003). This means that the land use of the different parts of the 
metropolitan area reflect the needs and the opportunities of their population. The wealthier areas 
have better overall living conditions and more assured access to services (e.g. access to water 
supply and sewerage, collection of solid wastes, schools, hospitals, road infrastructure, etc.) 
compared to the less wealthy areas. 
 
  11In terms of access to drinking water, figure 5 shows the location of the settlements that do not 
have access to water in their houses. 
 
Figure 5.  Distribution of houses without drinking water, ZMCM 




Except for the areas from where no information is available, most of the population have access 
to tap water. It is important to note that this does not mean that there are no problems in terms of 
quality of the service or water quality. It only means that most of the houses receive water at low 
subsidised prices, irrespective of their socio-economic levels.  
 
Figure 6 shows houses that are not connected to the sewer system. Not only houses exist in low-
income areas without any access to sewerage, but also houses in medium and high-income areas 
are not connected to the sewers because of the type of soil on which the houses were constructed. 
This is the case for many wealthy areas in the south of Mexico City, where people rely on septic 
tanks, which are often not properly constructed and managed.  
 
Even though there is no statistical information available on the living conditions of the people 
living in the conservation areas of the City, many of these houses do not have access to water 
supply and sewerage. The main reason for this is that these areas have developed very fast, and 
have exceeded, by far, the capacities of the governments at all levels to respond to the needs in a 
timely and appropriate manner.  
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Figure 6. Distribution of houses without sewage, ZMCM 
Source: Centro de Investigación en Geografía y Geomática “Ing. Jorge L. Tamayo”, Mexico. 
 
 
For a region having a population of more than 20 million people, which is steadily increasing, 
the provision of all services, including water supply and sewerage, has been a challenging task. 
Not all the responsibilities for water supply and sanitation should be exclusively in the hands of 
the different levels of governments. Population must also develop a sense of responsibility and 
participate actively in the conservation, protection and management of water resources, since in 
the final analysis, water supply and sanitation is for their own benefit and use. 
 
 
CONSERVATION AREAS AND URBAN GROWTH 
 
Conservation of the rural areas is fundamental for the water security of Mexico City since it has 
a direct bearing on groundwater recharge. Rural areas within Mexico City are considered to be 
conservation areas under the Law of Urban Development
4. In Article 30.II, the Law defines 
conservation area as “the land which should be considered as such according to its location, 
extension, vulnerability and quality; that which has an impact on the environment and on land 
use planning; mountains and areas useful for the recharge of the aquifer; hills, valleys and 
elevations which are natural elements of the land of the City; and land for agricultural and 
                                                           
4 The Law of Urban Development of Federal District was published on the Official Magazine of Federal District 
(Gaceta Oficial del Distrito Federal) on 29 January 1996; and on the Official Newspaper of the Country (Diario 
Oficial de la Federación) on 7 February 1996. It has been modified three times: on 23 February 1999 and published 
on Gaceta Oficial del Distrito Federal. No. 25; on 29 January 2004, published on Gaceta Oficial del Distrito Federal 
No. 8-TER, and on 29 January 2004, published on Gaceta Oficial del Distrito Federal No. 8-TER. 
 
  13livestock activities, for fisheries, forestry, agroindustry and tourism, as well as rural settlements.” 
 
Conservation areas are under increasing threat because of steady urban growth. During 1980-
2000, 76 percent (377,000 units) of the new houses that were constructed in Mexico City were 
located in the seven boroughs with most conservation area, mainly in Xochimilco (more than 
78,000 houses) and Tlalpan (76,000). Out of the 44 rural settlements that still exist in Mexico 
City, 35 of them (400,000 people) are located in conservation areas.  
 
Expansion of illegal settlements has also become a critical problem for the City. In 2003, there 
were 804 so-called irregular settlements with approximately 60,000 families, living in 2,400 ha 
of land for periods between 10 and 22 years (SMA Programa de Protección Ambiental del DF 
2002-2006, in PNUMA et al., 2003). Some 80 percent of these families are in Tlalpan, 
Xochimilco and Cuajimalpa, and about 20 percent of them live in dangerous places such as river 
beds.  
 
Land use in conservation areas is becoming increasingly urban (10.3 percent). Forests account 
for 34.6 percent (70 percent in Milpa Alta and Tlalpan); agriculture for 35.6 percent (more than 
60 percent in Milpa Alta, Tlalpan and Xochimilco); pasture and thicket for 16.2 percent (80 
percent in Tlalpan and Milpa Alta, mostly for livestock); and 0.01 percent for wetlands (PNUMA 
et al., 2003). 
 
Even though there are urban land use programmes whose main objective is to control the 
expansion of rural and irregular settlements in conservation areas, the demand for all types of 
settlements has been overwhelming. It has simply surpassed any attempts by the public 
institutions to catch up with the demands for housing and infrastructure, and to provide 
appropriate services. The net result has been that people often do not have access to even basic 
services such as electricity, water supply and sewerage, which is especially relevant for 
settlements in conservation areas. Overall, the demands for housing and infrastructure by all 
socio-economic levels have been continually increasing. The unsustainable urban growth and 
inadequate management have resulted in a mounting pressure on the federal and local 
governments to provide more and better services. At the same time, people are now reluctant to 





The water supply in the ZMCM depends primarily on local groundwater sources and on 
interbasin transfers. Mexico City, and the most populated 17 municipalities of the State of 
Mexico, share the same sources of water, as well as the infrastructure for water distribution. 
 
In 2002, the volume of water supplied to the ZMCM was 2.236 MCM/day (1.200 MCM/day 
from 374 deep wells; 0.071 MCM/day from 18 springs only for Mexico City, and 0.964 
MCM/day from 97 sources of water, such as snowmelt in the case of State of Mexico
5) (INEGI, 
2003). The second main source of water is the Lerma-Balsas and the Cutzamala River systems, 
which will be discussed later. It is estimated that the ZMCM receives 66 m
3/sec mainly for 
                                                           
5 Figures include only the municipalities of the State of Mexico where information was available. 
 
  14domestic supply, with Mexico City receiving about 35m
3/sec and 31m
3/sec for the State of 
Mexico (see Table 4). Within Mexico City, the water is distributed to the users through a primary 
network of 1,074 km of pipelines (with diameters of 0.5-1.83 m) and a secondary network of 
12,278 km (with diameters of less than 0.50 m). The water supply system comprises of 16 dams 
having a total storage capacity of 2,827.90 km
3 (INEGI, 2000b). Data are not available for the 
municipalities in the State of Mexico. 
 
Table 4. Water Supply Sources for Mexico City Metropolitan Area 
 
 Federal  District 
(m
3/s) 







Internal sources  20.0  25.2  45.2  68.5 
   Wells  19.0  24.8  43.8  66.4 
   Springs and   
   rivers 
1.0 0.4  1.4  2.1 
External sources  14.8  6.0  20.8  31.5 
   Cutzamala  9.9  5.0  14.9  22.6 
   Lerma  4.9  1.0  5.9  8.9 
Total 34.8  31.2  66.0  100.0 
Percentage 52.7 47.3  100.0   
٭ Only municipalities which are part of the ZMCM. 
Source: DGCOH, 1997; CAEM, 2003. In Marañón, 2004. 
 
 
In 2000, 95.3 percent of the population in Mexico City and 84.2 percent in the State of Mexico 
had access to water, either with a water connection directly to the house or from common faucets 
in the neighbourhood (INEGI, 2000a). However, most of the aquifers, springs and rivers which 
supply water to the ZMCM are located to its west, north and south. Thus, water supply is 
irregular and unreliable for the people living in the eastern part, who are also most affected by 
water shortages.  
 
More than 5 percent of the people living in the metropolitan area still do not have access to 
water. While some of them receive water from the government in pipes, people have to pay 
water from private vendors. The cost of water (200 litre-containers) often represents from 6 to 25 
percent of their daily salaries. Poor people who buy water from trucks pay around 500 percent 
times more than the domestic consumers. In addition, drinking water for much of the population 
in the ZMCM comes from 20-30 litre-containers of purified water, which are sold commercially. 
The reason for this is near universal distrust for the quality of the tap water. This means that not 
only people with no access to tap water spend a certain percentage of their income buying bottled 
water, but also people with access to tap buy containers of water which quality control leaves 
much to be desired. Mexico as a country is, in fact, the second largest consumer of bottled water 
in the world. Consumption has increased from 11.6 billion litres in 1999 to 17.7 in 2004 
(Rodwan, 2004). 
 
In terms of sewerage networks, according to the Mexico City Water System (Sistema de Agua  
de la Ciudad de México in Spanish), the institution responsible for water supply and sanitation 
services in Mexico City, in 2005, there were 2,087 km of primary sewage pipes (diameters of 0.6 
  15m of higher) and 10,237 km of secondary network (diameters of less than 0.6 m). The extension 
of the network will service coverage increases.  
 
The volume of wastewater discharged in Mexico City in 2004 was 2.260 MCM (Sistema de 
Aguas de la Ciudad de México, personal communication), of which less than 10 percent is 
treated. No information is available for the State of Mexico.  
 
There are 25 treatment plants in Mexico City and 41 in the municipalities of the State of Mexico 
that are part of the metropolitan area. These 65 plants have a total installed capacity of 10,174 l/s 
(6,412 l/s in Mexico City and 3,763 l/s in the State of Mexico). In total, only 9 percent of the 
annual volume of water supplied to Mexico City is treated. The information on the volume of 
water treated in the State of Mexico is not available (INEGI, 2000). Nor is it known the number 




MAIN SOURCES OF WATER FOR MEXICO CITY METROPOLITAN AREA 
 
The ZMCM is located in the Valley of Mexico basin, which is surrounded by the basins of 
Lerma, Cutzamala, Amacuzac, Libres Oriental and Tecolutla Rivers (INEGI 2001). The Lerma 
and the Cutzamala River basins, together with the aquifer of the Valley of Mexico, are the main 
sources of water for the metropolitan area. The aquifer of the Valley of Mexico contributes with 
70 percent, the Lerma-Balsas River basin with 9 percent and the Cutzamala River basins with 21 
percent. The very few surface water bodies that still exist in the basin of the Valley of Mexico 
provides only 2.5 percent of water supplied (INEGI, 2000; CNA 1997, b).  
 
Mexico Valley Aquifer 
 
The annual rate of withdrawal from the aquifers is significantly higher than the recharge rate: 45-
54 m
3/s is abstracted each year, but natural recharge rate is only about 20 m
3/s. This mismatch 
has resulted in a significant overexploitation, which has contributed to the lowering of 
groundwater table by about one metre each year. Steady lowering of the groundwater level 
increased the land subsidence rate, initially to 10 cm/year, and later up to 30 to 40 cm/year. The 
average annual subsidence rates in the area of the International Airport of Mexico City is 20-25 
cm, and in the City Centre is around 10 cm. It is estimated that the central area of the 
metropolitan area has subsided by 10 m during the past 100 years (Gobierno del Distrito Federal 
et al., 2004; INEGI 2001; Legorreta et al., 1997).   
 
However, the problems related to water supply in the metropolitan area extend well beyond the 
subsidence of the city. For example, the water supply and drainage systems have become not 
only very large and complex, but also obsolete in many areas. Provision of water services varies 
in the different parts of the city, tariffs are still heavily subsidised, quality of water supplied 
leaves much to be desired, levels of unaccounted for water is unacceptably high, and population 
wastes enormous amounts of water. People living in wealthy areas use up to 600 litres per capita 
per day, while the corresponding rate in the poor areas is about 20 litres. 
 
Use of deep wells has resulted in increasing iron and manganese contents of water, thus 
  16decreasing water quality and making water treatment more expensive. Water infrastructure has 
become more vulnerable to earthquakes. Overexploitation is reducing soil moisture in the 
surrounding mountains, which is damaging forest covers and affecting ecosystems adversely.  
 
A very high percentage of water is lost from the distribution networks because of leakages and 
illegal connections. Inappropriate overall management, aged pipes, inadequate maintenance over 
prolonged periods, poor construction practices and continuing land subsidence, are contributing 
to high levels for unaccounted for water. It is estimated that more than 40 percent of water is lost 
in the network due to leakages, which represents about 130 l/person/day. It is estimated that this 
volume of water would be enough to provide service to 4 million people (Secretaría de Obras y 
Servicios, 2002; UNAM, 1997).  
 
Lerma Valley Aquifer 
 
In 1942, the Lerma Valley project (62 km from Mexico City) was initiated to meet the steadily 
increasing demands of water from the metropolitan area. The first stage was planned and 
constructed to bring 4 m
3/sec of water to the metropolitan area. It included the construction of 
five wells between 50 and 308 m deep, for groundwater abstraction, and a 62 km, 2.5 diameter 
pipe for its distribution. This pipe is laid along the Sierra de las Cruces, through the 14 km long 
Atarasquillo-Dos Rios tunnel. Four tanks, 100 m in diameter, and 10 m in depth, were built in 
Mexico City for storage. This water is then distributed to the City by gravity. The increasing 
demands for water resulted in the construction of the second stage of the project. Between 1965-
1975, some 230 deep wells were dug, which increased the volume of water abstracted to 14 
m
3/sec. However, due to environmental impacts and social conflicts, the volume abstracted had 
to be reduced later to 6 m
3/sec (Legorreta et al., 1997).  
 
The political relationship between the authorities of Mexico City and the State of Mexico have 
been strongly influenced by the social conflicts that have resulted from the inter-basin transfer of 
water from the Lerma Valley to the metropolitan area. The main interest of the Federal and the 
Mexico City governments has been primarily to guarantee water supply to Mexico City. As a 
way of compensating the local populations, small projects were constructed in the towns that 
were adversely affected by the water transfer project. The overexploitation of the aquifers in the 
Lerma area has reduced the fertility of the soils. Agriculture has now become mainly rain-fed, 
and not irrigated as earlier. The economy of the region and the life of the population have 




In 1976, the “Cutzamala System” was planned to supply water to the metropolitan area from the 
Cutzamala River, and thus reduce the overexploitation of the Mexico Valley aquifer. The water 
is transferred from 60 to 154 km away, and then pumped to a height of more than 1000 m, 
requiring 102 pumping stations, 17 tunnels and 7.5 km of canals, which makes this project 
extremely energy-intensive and expensive (CNA 1997b).  
 
Initially, what later became the Cutzamala System, was planned as a hydropower project, called 
Miguel Aleman Hydroelectric System. Cutzamala was started by taking advantage of the 
infrastructures for hydropower generation, but the planned water use was changed. Currently, 
  17only 3 m
3/s is used to generate hydropower during peak hours and to satisfy the local energy 
requirements for agricultural and industrial sectors (CNA, 1997b). Due to the magnitude of the 
project, its construction was initially planned in three stages. The first stage has been under 
operation from 1982 (4 m
3/s), the second from 1985 (6 m
3/s) and the third one from 1993 (9 
m
3/s) (CNA no date, b). During the first stage of the project, water was brought form Victoria 
Dam and was distributed through a 77 km long and 2.5 m diameter aqueduct, which crosses the 
Sierra de las Cruces. The second and third stages of the project included the construction of both 
a water treatment plant and a central aqueduct. The implementation of these two stages was very 
complex mainly due to the height to which the water had to be pumped: 1,100 m. Electricity 
used to pump the total volume of water from the Cutzamala system only up to the treatment plant 
is equivalent to the energy that is consumed by the city of Puebla, having a population of 8.3 
million people (Legorreta et al., 1997). An overview of the infrastructure for Cutzamala System 
is presented in figure 7. The elevation at which the different dams and pumping plants of the 
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Figure 7. Overview of the Infrastructure for Cutzamala System. 
Source: IMTA, 1987, Visita al Sistema Cutzamala. Boletín No. 2.  
Instituto Mexicano de Tecnología del Agua, México. 
 
 
In terms of investments, according to the EIA carried out for the fourth stage of Cutzalama, the 
total cost of the first three stages of Cutzamala was $965 million (1996 estimates). If the 
  18estimated cost of the earlier hydroelectric plant is added, the total investment cost becomes 
$1,300 million. The cost of the cancelled hydropower system, having a total installed capacity of 
372 Mw, has been estimated at $325 million, at an average cost of $875,000/MW. The total cost 
of the Cutzamala System at $1300 million (mainly construction and equipment costs) was higher 
than the national investment in the entire public sector in Mexico, in 1996, in the areas of 
education ($700 million), health and social security ($400 million), agriculture, livestock and 
rural development ($105 million), tourism ($50 million), and marine sector ($60 million). Up to 
1994, the Cutzamala System alone represented three times the annual infrastructure expenditure 
of the Ministry of Environment, Natural Resources and Fisheries for 1996, which was more than 
$470 million (CNA, 1997b). 
 
The annual energy requirements to operate the Cutzamala System are about 1,787 million kWh, 
representing an approximate cost of $62.54 million. The investment would increase significantly 
if the costs in personnel ($1.5 million/year) and water treatment process costs were added (CNA, 
1997b). If only the operational costs for running the Cutzamala System are considered (about 
$128.5 million/year), supplying 600 million m
3 of water (19 m
3/s) would mean an average cost 
per cubic metre of water of $0.214 and an energy consumption of 6.05 kWh/m
3. Hence, the price 
charged to the consumers, about $0.2/m
3, is not enough to cover either the operational costs of 
the Cutzamala System, or the treatment and distribution costs of water to the metropolitan area.  
 
In addition to the construction of the Cutzamala, about 190 so-called social projects were built 
for the benefit of some of the people living in the municipalities who are mostly affected by 
water shortages. These projects were built jointly by CNA and the communities, and consist 
mainly of construction, enlargement and rehabilitation of water supply and sanitation systems, as 
well as construction and rehabilitation of houses, schools, and farms. Equally important was the 
construction and the rehabilitation of roads by CNA, both for Cutzamala and the local 
population. The cost of these so-called social projects was estimated in 1996 to be equivalent to 
5 percent of the direct investment of the Cutzamala, which would represent an additional $45 
million (CNA, 1997b). A very important issue that had not been resolved as of March 2006, has 
been the resettlement of the affected communities due to the construction of the Cutzamala 
project, who after all these years, still have not received the expected compensation.  
 
The programme on drinking water and sanitation of the metropolitan area considers the 
construction of a fourth stage of Cutzamala to increase the volume of water transferred to the 
Valley of Mexico from 0.6 km
3/year (19 m
3/s) to 0.76 km
3/year (24 m
3/s), and to treat 1.3 
km
3/year (42 m
3/s) of wastewater. In 1997, the fourth stage of Cutzamala (Temascaltepec 
project) was to be initiated. This stage included the construction of a 120 m high dam, 743 m 
long at the crest. The reservoir would have a capacity of 65 millions m
3, and regulate an average 
flow of 5,000 l/s. The project envisages a 15 m
3/s pumping station, and construction of 18 km of 
canals and 12 km of tunnels (CNA, 1997b). The water would flow to the Valle de Bravo Dam 
through a 18.75 km long and 3.5 m diameter tunnel. According with official figures, the initial 
investment is estimated to be $502 million. Once the fourth stage of the Cutzamala is 
operational, the volume of water would increase only by 5 m




As of March 2006, Temascaltepec project has not been started because of serious social 
constraints. The population of some of the villages of Temascaltepec are afraid that the 
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and will affect the agricultural production of the area )maize, sugar cane, banana, tomato, melon 
and peas). Even though the local people who would be affected by the project are against the 
project (El Universal, December 2005; Agua Latinoamérica, 2004; La Jornada, 15 July 2004; 
Legorreta et al., 1997), authorities consider the development of Temascaltepec River of utmost 
importance for the development, not only of Mexico City, but also of the State of Mexico as 
noted in the Development Plan of the State of Mexico 1999-2005 (Government of State of 
Mexico, 1995).  
 
Studies have indicated for years, that if the leakages in the distribution system in the ZMCM 
were repaired, there would be no need to construct the fourth stage of the project. This means 
that the additional water supply of 5 m
3/s that is being planned with very high economic, social 
and environmental costs would not be necessary. However, this type of rational planning and 
management continues to be absent in the relevant water management institutions. 
 
In addition to Cutzamala, the other sources of water that the Federal Government has identified 
for potential contribution to the water supply of the metropolitan area are the Amacuzac, 
Tecolutla and Atoyac Rivers (Gobierno del Distrito Federal et al., 2004). The project of the 
Amacuzac River would include the construction of a 185 m high and 450 m wide dam, with an 
inundated area of 67 km
2, and having a storage capacity of 4,000 MCM. The dam would be 
located in the borders between the states of Morelos, Guerrero and Puebla. Water distribution 
from this site to the ZMCM would require the construction of a 160 km long aqueduct, and, 
depending on the final design, either two pipes of 4.5 m of diameter, or three pipes of 3.5 m 
diameter. Water would have to be pumped to a height of 1,825 m, requiring a generating 
capacity of 4,000 MW. The annual electric power consumption for this system is estimated to be 
5 percent of the annual national electric power production, representing 16.5 million barrels of 
oil per year. It is claimed that this project will make it unnecessary to abstract 50 m
3/sec of 
groundwater from the Valley of Mexico aquifer any more. The rational is that the groundwater 
would be used only during periods of severe droughts, or when the other water distribution 
systems were not working due to maintenance activities (CCE and CMIC, 2000).  
 
Under these conditions, it will certainly be more economical, socially acceptable and 
environmentally desirable to consider first demand management practices like reduction of 
unaccounted for losses, water pricing and other water conservation practices, before embarking 
upon extremely expensive new water development projects, with high social and environmental 
costs. It has been estimated that each cubic meter of water from the Cutzalama River required an 
investment of 23 million dollars. This estimate would increase by a factor of four if the source of 
water were the Amacuzac River (INEGI 2001). 
 
Governmental institutions have basically ignored in the past the potential social conflicts and 
disruptions that could result from interbasin water transfers. In addition, no authoritative analyses 
have been made on the nature of the beneficiaries and the people who may have to pay the costs. 
Surprisingly, even the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for the fourth stage of the 
Cutzamala System (CNA 1997b) does not consider any social costs. As most of the EIA that are 
carried out in Mexico, it considers almost physical technical factors: social issues are 
conspicuous by their absence (Tortajada, 2001, 1999). In 2003, the government of the State of 
Mexico took the government of Mexico City to court and demanded a compensation of $2.2 
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water to the detriment of people in the State of Mexico. The decision of the Supreme Court was 
expected to set precedents for similar cases in the future. However, in October 2005, the newly 
elected Governor of State of Mexico publicly declared that he would withdraw the court case, 
since he preferred to work with the Federal and Mexico City governments to find an amicable 
solution. 
 
Aqueducts: Cutzamala-Macrocircuito and Cutzamala-Aquaférico 
 
The Federal Government, as well as the government of the State of Mexico and CNA, initiated 
the construction of two distribution lines in 1980 to ensure a more efficient distribution of water 
from the Cutzamala System. The Mexico City was constructing a water distribution system 
known as “Aquaférico” which would come from the west, and would supply water to the 
southern and eastern parts of ZMCM.  
 
In the State of Mexico, the water distribution system is known as “Macrocircuito”.  It would be 
constructed around most of Mexico City towards the north, and would carry water to the 
northern, southern and eastern parts of the City (CNA no date, d,e,f). The first stage of this 
system was inaugurated in October 1994. Both the first and the second stages are now in 
operation, and provide a continuous supply of 4 m
3/s. This has benefited around 1.4 million 
people, with a supply of 250 l/capita/day. The operation of the third and fourth stages would 
increase water availability by an additional 7 m
3/s (total volume of 11 m
3/s), benefiting 
4,752,000 inhabitants who live in the eastern and northern parts of the State of Mexico, with 
approximately 200 l/day/person (CNA, no date d,e,f; CNA, 1997c). The system includes the 
construction of two pipelines, having a total length of 168.28 km. This is in addition to 58.28 km 
of pipelines that have already been constructed. The two pipelines will require a surface area of 
336.56 ha, plus 71 ha for the storage tanks (CNA, 1997c).  
 
The total investment costs for Macrocircuito, between 1987 and 1997, was $78 million, while 
the estimated cost for the third and fourth stages (1997-2000) was expected to be about $190 
million, making a total investment of $268 million. This amount represents almost half of the 
total public sector budget at the national level for 1995 ($563 million) in the areas of urban 
development, ecology and drinking water (CNA, 1997c). 
 
The projects were expected to be completed by 2000, but so far the construction has progressed 





The soil of Mexico City is basically clay, and thus susceptible to compaction. Accordingly, the 
higher the volume of water abstracted, higher is the rate of land subsidence (CNA, 1997b). The 
sinking of the city has resulted in extensive damages to its infrastructure, including water supply 
and sewerage systems and degradation of the groundwater quality. It has also required the 
construction of costly pumping stations to remove wastewater and stormwater from the City.  
 
At the beginning of the last century, the sewerage system (Great Sewerage Canal, Gran Canal 
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and, by 1950, the uneven settlement of the sewerage network made it necessary to pump 
wastewater from the small sewerage lines to the level of the main wastewater collector of the 
city, thus significantly increasing both maintenance and operation costs. The Great Canal has 
been affected by land subsidence so much, that at present the first 20 km have lost their 
inclination almost totally. In addition, continually increasing population in the metropolitan area 
has rendered the wastewater collection and treatment capacity insufficient.  
 
Accordingly, in 1967, a decision was taken to build another main collector for wastewaters for 
both Mexico City and the State of Mexico as a combined sewage and stormwater network (Deep 
Sewerage, Drenaje Profundo). A system of 60 km of sewerage interceptors and deep collectors 
were constructed along with a new artificial exit from the basin of Mexico in 1975. By 1997, 
there were 153 km of tunnels in operation. The Deep Sewerage had to be constructed up to 200 
m below the ground level to ensure that it will not be affected by land subsidence (Domínguez, 
2000; DGCOH, no date; 1990). 
 
The Deep Sewerage has more than 80 interceptors and carries an average annual flow of 48 m
3/s 
of wastewater and 14 m
3/s of stormwater through primary and secondary networks. The primary 
network is 50 km long and 6.5 m in diameter, and it is connected to the secondary network, 
transporting municipal and industrial wastewater, and stormwater through 3.1 m to 5 m diameter 
tunnels (INEGI, 1999). The Deep Sewerage system stores, transports and disposes wastewater 
and stormwater through four artificial channels located at the northern end of the basin of 
Mexico. The system includes 66 pumping stations, regulatory tanks for flow control, storm 
tanks, 111 km of open canals, rivers which are now used for transporting wastewater, 16 dams, 
lagoons. The average volume of wastewater and stormwater that is discharged into the ZMCM 
sewerage system is 2,897 MCM (INEGI, 2001). In 2004, this was 2,260.23 MCM.  
  
A new interceptor was constructed during 1998-2000 period for the Great Canal. It was to 
transport stormwater from Mexico City downtown by gravity and thus alleviate the threat of 
floods in this part of the City. The interceptor is a 1000 m long and 3.1 m diameter, tunnel built 
20 m below the ground level, with a capacity of 35 m
3/s (DDF, no date).  
 
Since the City is located within a naturally closed hydrologic basin, it is especially vulnerable to 
floods. Throughout history, artificial channels had to be constructed to take wastewater and 
stormwater from of the City. The rainy season in the metropolitan area is characterised by storms 
of high intensities over short durations. The average annual rainfall in the City is 800 mm: 500 
mm in the eastern part and around 1000 mm towards the southern and western parts 
(Domínguez, 2000). The main collector of the Deep Sewerage was designed to carry about 200 
m
3/s of water over a 45-hour period. However, it has carried up to 340 m
3/s. Such sudden 
fluctuations in the amounts of water that have to be drained create major operational and 
maintenance problems. 
  
The floods in Mexico City can be explained due to the difference in levels between some parts of 
the City and the Great Canal, as well as the inability of the sewerage system to pump out all the 
water during the rainy seasons quickly. For example, due to the subsidence in the City, 
downtown is 7 m below the highest point of the Great Canal (Legorreta et al., 1997). Since the 
secondary sewerage network is insufficient to carry high volumes of storm and wastewater, 
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interceptor where the Great Canal has lost its gradient. Many times, wastewater has also flooded 
the streets in these areas, but for short durations.  
 
Some 30 years ago, the Great Canal could discharge 90 m
3/s. At present, it discharges only 12 
m
3/s. Due to this increasing inefficiency, the Deep Sewerage did not receive proper maintenance 
until 1995, when the heavily silted primary sewerage network could be cleaned. In May 2005, 
the Water System of Mexico City initiated monitoring activities to check the status of different 
sections of the main sewerage network of the Deep Sewerage, especially in terms of the 
infrastructure and level of siltation. The risks presented by sulphuric acid and methane to human 
beings were nullified by adding a chemical (Albisol) to reduce both the acid and the methane to 
negligible levels. The main findings were that the percolation of water to the tunnels was minor, 
that concrete of the walls of the tunnel had not deteriorated seriously, and that siltation was not 
serious enough to prevent water from flowing out the network system.  
 
The 1995 Master Plans for Drinking Water and for Sewerage for the Mexico City (DGCOH, 
1997a,b) outlined the different types of strategies, including infrastructure, necessary to improve 
the supply, storage and transportation of drinking water in the City, as well as the storage, 
transportation and disposal of wastewater and stormwater out of it. However, these plans also 
noted that, in addition to very high investment costs, infrastructure would also require several 
years for construction (DGCOH, 1995a,b). This means that in spite of the importance of the 
infrastructure as part of a water and wastewater management strategy for the Mexico City, this is 
not the only alternative available.  
 
One example is the so-called “reuse” of wastewater produced in the ZMCM. The disposal of 
untreated wastewater has become a serious problem for the metropolitan area, especially when 
the high volume and the nature and levels of pollutants contained therein are considered. The 
problems created by the current effluent disposal practices are now affecting neighbouring areas 
of the region, where wastewater is discharged. This has created very significant health and 
environment-related problems and concerns. 
 
Globally, ZMCM is now by far the largest single producer and exporter of wastewater that is 
used for agricultural purposes. From the beginning of the 20 century, wastewater from the City 
has been diverted to the Mezquital Valley, in the nearby state of Hidalgo, located 109 km north 
of Mexico City. Otherwise a semiarid region, the Valley has become an important agricultural 
area by using this untreated wastewater, with 110,000 ha of official and unofficial command 
area, and more than 50,000 water users in the different irrigation districts.  
 
In the Mezquital Valley, the main crops grown are alfalfa and maize, representing some 60-80% 
of the total irrigated area. Cultivation of higher-value crops is forbidden by law due to health 
considerations. This practice of wastewater irrigation has provided added nutrients to soils and it 
has been a source of water for economic activities. However, for many years, it has also 
represented a very high risk to the health of not only the population who live and work in the 
irrigation districts, but also to the consumers (IDRC, 2002). 
 
In 1996, the Inter-American Development Bank approved a $1.035 billion project for the Mexico 
Valley Sanitation Project. Unfortunately. This much-needed project did not proceed for several 
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Authorities from the State of Mexico and National Water Commission, were working jointly 
with the Inter-American Development Bank and the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation 
to develop the terms and references to publish three tenders to build four wastewater treatment 
plants. The total budget for this project was approximately $1 billion, of which IDB would 
contribute $365 million for the collectors system and JBIC would provide $670 million for the 
wastewater treatment plants (STAT-USA, 2004, available at www.stat-usa.gov/). No public 
information is available as to what has happened to these projects. The disturbing fact continues 
to be that more than 60m
3/s of wastewater continues to be discharged with no treatment 
whatsoever.  
 
The continuous transfer of wastewater over a century and the excessive irrigation by the farmers 
to counteract its salinity, have resulted into groundwater recharge of the local aquifer. The 
groundwater level table has gone up and several springs have appeared, which have become a 
source of water for the local population. Unfortunately, no serious and reliable study is currently 
available on the quality of groundwater or the springs in the Valley, as well as their overall 
impacts on human health and the environment.   
 
Clearly, long-term and rational planning is urgently needed in the ZMCM including an efficient 
systemic strategy for drinking water and wastewater management. There is an urgent need to 
formulate coordinated policies for the development and management of the metropolitan area as 
a whole. Until now, there are no signs that this is likely to occur in the near future. As the 
National Population Council (CONAPO 2000, p.79) has noted: “there is no long-term planning 
for the ZMCM in terms of urban development, including provision of services such as housing 
and infrastructure.” This lack of systemic planning is contributing to increasingly disorganised 
development of the metropolitan area, which will require a never-ending provision of services 
such as water supply and sanitation. In addition, technical, managerial and administrative 




WATER PRICING POLICIES 
 
In the ZMCM, drinking water is charged per cubic meter and its price increases with the highest 
consumption levels. Within the metropolitan area, there is no uniform policy for water pricing. It 
is decided independently by the governments of Mexico City and the State of Mexico, and even 
by the few water utilities that operate in some of the municipalities in the State of Mexico. 
 
One of the main problems for the local governments in terms of cost-recovery has been that there 
were, and still are, numerous water connections that are not registered, and thus consumption 
through them is neither recorded nor charged. In 2000, it was officially estimated that there were 
about 2.5 million water connections in the ZMCM: 67 percent domestic, 16 percent commercial 
and 17 percent industrial (INEGI, 2001). However, these figures represent only approximately 
64 percent of the existing connections, the rest are illegal.  
 
Another reason as to why water consumed is not charged in the metropolitan area is because 
most houses do not have meters. In fact, only 49% of the legal connections are metered. In 
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administration costs. It is estimated that in 1997, only 43.6 percent of water was billed at the 
national level (INEGI, 2000b). 
 
In the case of the Mexico City, the local government has recognised the limitations it faces to 
provide water to its population. Some of the main problems that have been identified include a 
deficit of water availability of 3,000 l/sec; leakages of more than 30 percent because of poor 
conditions of the networks; unreliable water supply received by at least one million people; the 
number of people with no access to water is increasing; and, as of January 2004, Mexico City 
had not had new sources of water for the previous eight years (Gobierno del Distrito Federal, 
2003). 
 
Even though the government expects the implementation of the Stage IV of the Cutzamala 
System, it has acknowledged that this project, if and when it is implemented, will take several 
years to be completed. This situation has forced the government of Mexico City to develop an 
immediate strategy to improve the current situation in terms of providing drinking water to the 
City. The importance of using economic instruments to improve water and wastewater 
management is slowly being realised. Water can no longer be considered as a public good that is 
to be supplied by the State to all the users at highly subsidised prices. The strategy for water 
management currently includes legal and institutional reforms; participation of the private sector 
for specific activities, such as billing, meter-reading and leakage repairs; and modifications of 
the pricing mechanism.  
 
A census of water users was carried out between 1994 and 1996. It included all properties and 
taps that existed in all 16 boroughs. Users were identified and a users´ register was prepared. In 
addition, water consumption were measured (which was virtually non-existent earlier) by 
installing meters in more than 90 percent of the properties. Even though Mexico City has not 
received additional volumes of water since 1995, the programmes of meter-reading and detection 
and repair of leaks are claimed to have saved 2.8 m
3/s of water, with which it has been possible 
to provide more people with drinking water (Marañón, 2005). Table 5 shows some indicators 
that illustrate the improvements that have been recently achieved. 
 
In terms of perceptions of the users on the quality of water services, the main complaints are on 
poor water quality, reliability of the service, and pricing (Marañón, 2004). While the differences 
in opinions may be considered normal within such a large population, the fact remains that there 
is a very high percentage of poor people in the city and hence special attention has to be paid to 
ensure that poor people have access to water in a fair and equitable manner. 
 
Table 5. Efficiency indicators for drinking water supply in Mexico City, 1996 and 2001 
 
Indicators 1996  2001 
Volume of water delivered  686.6 million m
3 752.2 million m
3
Volume of water produced  1,096.9 million m
3 1,087.0 million m
3
Number of meters installed  737.2 thousand  1,255.9 thousand 
Number of users billed  1,477.5 thousand   1,769.1 thousand 
Amount of water billed   $1.1 million   $ 3.2 million 
Amount of water   $1.7 million   $ 3.8 million 
  25that was paid 
Source: Marañón, B., 2004, Tariffs for drinking water in Mexico City, 1992-2002: Towards water 
demand management? In: Water pricing and public-private partnership in the water sector, C. Tortajada 
and A.K. Biswas (eds.) Porrua, Mexico, 61-130. 
 
 
The evolution of the tariffs structure for the domestic sector is shown in Table 6.  
 





1996  1997  1998  1999 2000 2001 2002 
10.1-20.0  100.0  96.0  81.0  82.9 76.1 72.9 73.4 
20.1-30.0  100.0  172.8  169.4  162.6 149.4 143.1 144.2 
240.1-420.0  100.0  293.0  275.5  292.7 306.6 319.7 322.7 
420.1-660.0  100.0  582.1  613.3  653.6 684.5 714.0 720.7 
660.1-960.0  100.0  978.7  1049.9  1138.1 1192.0 1243.0 1254.7 
Source: Financial Codes of Mexico City, 1996-2002; and National Index of Prices for the Consumers, 
Bank of Mexico. In: Marañón, 2003, 2004. 
 
 
For the State of Mexico, drinking water is also priced volumetrically. Prices also increase with 
higher consumption levels, as is the case for Mexico City. However, in some municipalities, the 
tariffs also vary by areas depending upon their dominant socio-economic conditions. Various 
socio-economic strata have been defined within each municipality, and the people at the higher 
strata have to pay higher charges compared to the lower strata.  
 
The overall efficiency of water management in the municipalities that are part of the ZMCM is 
considered to be very low. For example, only 22.5 percent of domestic consumers pay for water 
as do 48.7 percent of non-domestic consumers. Furthermore, water charges in the State of 
Mexico are still based primarily on fixed rates. Accordingly, demand management practices have 
been mostly ignored by the institutions concerned. Table 7 shows selected efficiency indicators 
for 14 municipalities of State of Mexico, where information is available. 
 
Overall, neither Mexico City nor the State of Mexico have carried out serious studies on tariff 
structures. Accordingly, pricing has played only a minor role for managing water in the ZMCM. 
 
Table 7. Efficiency indicators for 14 water utilities in the municipalities of the State of 
Mexico which are part of the ZMCM, 2002 
 









$ 132.7 million 




$ 32.9 million  




$ 134.8 million  
  26Total payment by domestic consumers  22.5 percent 
Total payment by non-domestic consumers  48.7 percent 
Source: Comisión del Agua del Estado de México (2002). In: Marañón, 2004. 
 
 
There are many constraints to improve access to water, quality of water supplied, and overall 
water services. These constraints include issues like the fact that management continues to be 
very centralised, hierarchical and bureaucratic, pricing structures have not been properly 
developed, management and technical expertise available to manage water and wastewater 








The new strategy for water management in Mexico City was launched in 1992 as an effort to 
promote major structural changes. The idea was that water could no longer be considered as a 
public good (and, as a result, subsidised heavily by the State), but as an economic good. The 
institutions concerned faced a severe crisis because of deterioration of infrastructure and 
economic conditions, inefficiency, and a pricing system based primarily on fixed tariffs. It was 
also necessary to eliminate heavy subsidies because of financial reasons, and also to promote 
water conservation. In addition, due to economic constraints, it was not possible to expand and 
improve the supply to the poorest neighbourhoods. It was considered necessary to encourage 
private sector participation in different stages of production, distribution and sale of water 
(CADF, 1993:2-3). 
 
The new strategy had two objectives: guaranteeing the water supply that the city needed for its 
development in an environmentally-sustainable basis, and achieving financial self-sufficiency for 
the system (SF, 1997:20; CADF, 1994). Both immediate and long-term measures were planned 
in order to achieve these two goals. The immediate measures included updating the legal and 
institutional frameworks, including policy formulations, decision on who would be the authority 
to reduce or cut off the supply under specific conditions, and charges for discharging effluents 
into the sewerage system (a previous charge was only one-off payment to the National Water 
Commission). Concurrently, control was sought over the 10,000 major users who provided more 
than 60 percent of the revenue of the authority (SF: 1997:23). 
 
These measures were, however, not sufficient to achieve environmental sustainability and 
financial self-sufficiency. Consequently, the government had to promote two far-reaching 
measures which proved to be the keys to the new water strategy: water charges based on 
metering, and a rehabilitation programme for the distribution network to reduce leakages by 10-
15 percent (SF, 1997:25; CADF, 1994). It was also considered necessary to eliminate the 
overlapping functions of the several institutions involved in water management, and ensure the 
financial self-sufficiency of the water sector in the medium term. These steps were expected to 
                                                           
6 This section is based on information from Marañón, 2004 and 2005. Important literature on this topic also includes 
Martínez-Omaña et al., 2004; CCE and CMIC, 2000; and Chauvet-Urquidi, 1999. 
  27contribute to better coordination between water distribution, consumption and pricing and also 
bring the income and expenditures of the institution in balance. 
 
The objective was to create an institution that, either by itself or through outsourcing, would 
provide the essential services for drinking water, sewerage, and treatment and reuse of 
wastewater, in addition to efficiently operate, manage and maintain the related infrastructure 
(Beristain, 2002). The new institution was expected to be semi-autonomous, and manage all 
functions and facilities related to water. The main role of the new institution was to introduce a 
billing system based on metering, and bring the budget for water and sanitation into balance as 
quickly as possible. The private sector was to be invited to be in charge of distribution, metering, 
billing, customer support, and maintenance of the secondary networks. However, all these 
changes should have as little impact as possible on the organised labour, which were powerful 
groups within the institutions.  
 
On July 14, 1992, the Mexican President issued a decree creating the Federal District Water 
Commission (CADF, by its acronym in Spanish) as the sole autonomous administrative body 
responsible for the provision of drinking water, sewerage, and treatment and reuse of wastewater 
(CADF, 1993). For socio-political (staff reductions and subsequent labour protests) and financial 
(reduction in income) reasons, a decision was taken to gradually integrate the various functions 
of all the institutions that were then involved on water supply and wastewater. It was thought 
that, in the medium term, the CADF would evolve into an institution that would manage all 
aspects of the service efficiently. This policy was formulated with the expectation that changing 
water charges from a fixed to a consumption-based one would help to modernise the 




From the very beginning, the approach taken to promote private sector participation in Mexico 
City was somewhat unorthodox. The plan was for the private sector to take over gradually 
specific responsibilities. However, not one company was contracted for the tasks, but four. When 
the invitations were sent out to the private sector, no information was available on issues like the 
length of the network, names of the users, structure and volume of consumptions, levels of water 
losses, and billing and collection procedures. In the absence of such financial and operational 
information, contract negotiation was very difficult.  
 
According to CADF, in order to keep the services under the City government, private sector 
involvement in terms of sale of infrastructures, or a long-term concession to manage them, was 
considered inappropriate. Instead, participation of the private sector was introduced through 
service contracts for specific activities over a limited period of time. The property rights to the 
infrastructure and the control over the introduction of a new pricing system solely remained in 
the hands of the City government (CADF, 1995).  
 
The next step was to decide the extent of participation of the private companies. This was partly 
based on a political decision to maintain control and responsibility of the services in the public 
sector and partly on how the accounting, financial and operational information on the system 
could be improved. In order that the City government could retain the responsibility, the process 
used was somewhat similar to the French affermage system. Under this format, the government 
  28of the City would retain control and responsibility for the system, as well as property rights to the 
infrastructure and the authority to set tariffs (SF, 1997).  
 
Three stages were defined in keeping with the policy of phasing in the new system. In the first 
stage, contracts were to be issued for the installation of meters and consumption-based billing 
system, as well as for preparing registers of users and connections. Ideally, this was to be done 
on the basis of contracts that paid fixed amounts to the private companies on the basis of each 
user and each connection registered, as well as each meter installed (SF, 1997). 
 
In stage two, the contractors were to estimate costs on the basis of metering of the users, billing 
and updating of the registers of users and connections, and actual collection of bills. The 
payments to the contractors were to be based, at first, on each meter read and then billed 
according to actual consumption. Once adequate information was collected, payments would be 
determined according to a formula based on a percentage of the amount billed in each 
operational zone.   
 
In the third stage, the companies were to operate, maintain and rehabilitate the secondary water 
networks, as well as to install systems for leak detection, both visible and invisible. Initial 
payment was to be by kilometre of pipeline covered, and later on, by the volume of water 
supplied in each specific zone. In the general contract, this form of payment was called “payment 
by formula”
7. The contractors were to be paid according to a formula that established a price 
differential between a volume of water supplied to the contractor and the income generated by 
the distribution of that volume of water at the proposed tariffs in the specific area. The 
companies would operate and maintain the distribution system. If they failed, they would lose 
income because of non-payment by the users, and their costs would increase whenever there 
were leakages. This approach was expected to promote efficiency. The overall objective was to 
provide an improved service to the users and to encourage efficient and rational use of water. 
The price at which water was supplied to the contractor, and the difference between the supply 
and the prices, was to be determined once enough information was available on operational 
costs, extent of leakages, and levels of payment after a certain period during which the system 
was operational (SF, 1997). 
 
Another factor to note is the use of four companies rather than one. This was because of social 
and political reasons, which were claimed to outweigh the economic rationale. The finance 
department of the City claimed that, although in theory there could be a different contractor for 
each of the stages envisioned, efficiency incentives could be maximised by making one 
contractor responsible for all of them. This would ensure that the contractor would have a major 
incentive to install meters properly and promptly, and read them accurately so that their profit 
could be maximised. Finally, for strategic reasons, the City was divided into four zones (Number 
5 of the subsection of Chapter III of the General Bases of Tender). The reasons for this decisions 
were as follows: a) should one of the companies was unable to fulfil the contract conditions, any 
one of the other three would be immediately available to take over, thus reducing the monopoly 
power of each contractor; b) risks of collusion among contractors would be reduced, since there 
would be less chance for indulging in non-competitive practices; c) work could go on 
                                                           
7  The manner in which contractors were to be paid in each stage is described in The General Bases of Tender, 
clause four, section 4.6. Payments Formula are described in pages 34 and 35, subheading 4.6.3.1. 
  29simultaneously in the four areas where the potential for revenue generation was the greatest, thus 
increasing cash flow; d) four zones could be assigned without the need to pay a surcharge for 
areas having less than 250,000 connections; and e) the system would help to develop four good 
companies that would increase competition at the national level. 
 
The areas on which the City was divided were decided on the basis of a lineal programming 
model. The boroughs assigned to each bidder bordered on each other, thus facilitating full 
coverage. Areas having the greatest potentials were assigned to all the four different groups so 
that they could start working at the same time, and generate higher cash flows. The areas would 
be roughly similar in terms of the number of connections and the overall value of the contracts 
(SF, 1997). Finally, the contracts were expected to promote competition among the companies 
and ensure efficient water management in the City. 
 
Funding for the project came from the budget of the City government. In order to obtain the best 
possible financial terms, CADF made an agreement with the National Bank of Public Works and 
Services (BANOBRAS in Spanish), which made the Bank an agent to pay for the obligations of 
the City government under the contract. BANOBRAS agreed to make the payments (C. Casasús, 
Construcción, 1993:31, cited by Martínez-Omaña, 2002:182). The financial impact of replacing 
a system of fixed charges with one based on actual consumptions required an investment of $152 
million in 1992, and close to $3 billion in 1994 (CADF, 1993: 11, cited by Martínez-Omaña, 
2002, 182-183). “However, as established in the general contract, the contractors had to offer the 
City government financing for the activities of the first stage. The payments of the contractors 
for the work carried out were to be made bimonthly, consistent with the progress made in 
metering” (C. Casasús, CADF, Bases generales de licitación, contrato general, 1993)”. The 
contractors were also responsible for detecting visible and invisible leaks (Martínez-Omaña, 
2002). 
 
Tender and Selection of Companies  
 
The process to initiate private sector participation was initiated in November 1992, when the 
tender was published. The tender stipulated that bids could be submitted only by companies in 
which a majority of capital was under Mexican control. By February 1993, seven bids were 
received. Rather than accepting the most attractive offer, a decision was taken to divide the City 
into four zones. The general contracts were signed during the last quarter of 1993, followed by 
the specific first-stage contracts in May 1994, when fieldwork began. The second-stage contracts 
were signed in November-December 1994. The decision to divide the City into four zones was 
taken after the companies had submitted their bids. This was because senior members of the City 
government expressed serious concern over handing the responsibility for water supply to one 
single company. They were afraid that this might lead to a private sector monopoly.  
 
In accordance with the new scheme, 16 boroughs were divided into four zones as follows. 
Contract details can be seen in Table 8. 
 
•  Zone A: Gustavo A. Madero, Azcapotzalco and Cuauthémoc boroughs, with an estimated 
298,557 connections. 
•  Zone B: Benito Juárez, Coyoacán, Iztacalco and Venustiano Carranza, with an estimated 
257,825 connections. 
  30•  Zone C: Iztapalapa, Tláhuac, Xochimilco and Milpa Alta, with an estimated  327,408 
connections. 
•  Zone D: Tlalpan, Magdalena Contreras, Álvaro Obregón, Cuajimalpa y Miguel Hidalgo, 
with an estimated 263,789 connections. 
 
Table 8. Contract details, 1994 
 
Zone Consortium  Partners  Boroughs  No.  of 
connections 
A  SAPSA ICA 
CIE. Generale Des  
   Eaux 
BANAMEX 




B  IASA  Socios Ambientales de  












Xochimilco and Milpa 
Alta 
327,408 





and Miguel Hidalgo 
263,789 
       Source: CADF, 1994. 
 
 
According to the tender requirements, each company had to present a proposal addressing the 
following four areas:  
 
•  Client services, including meter reading, billing and customer services. This was to be 
done through offices in each of the boroughs, where users could apply to be connected or 
disconnected, change meters, etc. In addition, telephone call centres were to be 
established. 
•  Support services, including expertise. The responsibility of this area was to provide 
quality control and ensure that the procedures in use were always the best possible. 
•  Contracts and technical services. This included carrying out a census of users, registering 
meters and updating information on the networks. 
•  Operations. This would include meter maintenance (during the second stage) and 
detection of leaks and repairs for the pipelines (Martínez-Omaña, 2002). 
 
Implementation of the general contract was delayed for a variety of reasons, some legal but 
others due to administrative, political and financial reasons. Although the winning companies 
were selected in March 1993, the contracts were signed only in September 1993, and were 
effective from May 1994. The main reason for the delay was a judicial complaint lodged by one 
of the unsuccessful companies, GMD/Biwater. Administratively, CADF needed time to organise 
itself internally, and agree with the contractors on operational aspects such as how the work 
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devaluation meant a substantial increase in the cost of the imported meters. There were delays in 
the installation of meters because the budget assigned by the City government was insufficient to 
pay for them. 
 
Results According to Main Actors  
 
Based on interviews carried out by Marañón (2004) the main actors (officials, businessmen, 
academics and society in general) felt that the participation of the private sector had been 
generally positive. The detailed perceptions of different groups are discussed next. 
 
Institutional Opinions: CADF 
 
The broad consensus view was that the private sector participation had been positive especially 
in terms of its commercial operations (SF, 1997; Haggarty et al., 2001; Zentella, 2000; Beristain, 
2002; Saade, 2002 in Marañón, 2004). The companies were expected to collect basic information 
on the networks, prepare a register of users, install meters, and charge users for actual volumes 
of water consumed. Development of an economically sustainable system was considered 
important and, the system has become more efficient on all the above mentioned issues. 
 
Register of users 
 
An updated and reliable register of users is essential for managing any urban water system. 
Unfortunately, this simply did not exist for Mexico City. The authorities did not have a clear idea 
as to the number of consumers it had. Between 1994 and 1996, a general census was completed, 
including of water connections in all 16 boroughs. After this register was completed, it was 
possible to bill each user for the actual amount of water consumed. Table 9 shows the number of 
water connections that were identified each year, between 1994 and 1996 because of this census.  
 
Table 9. Update of water connections in Mexico City, 1994-1996 
 1994  1995  1996  Total 
Number of users identified 
(thousands) 
544.9 1,074.2  144.8 1,763.9 
Networks checked  
(square kilometres)  
 
83.3 320.4  276.3  680.0 




Before 1994, metering of consumption by users was virtually non-existent. The few meters 
installed were of different types and brands, and they were never properly maintained. In 1994, 
CADF launched a meter installation programme. In the first year of the programme, 205,200 
meters were installed, gradually increasing up to 1,264,500 in 2002 (914,100 were type “A” and 
350,400 type “B”
8). Metering reached more than 90 percent of users, a figure comparable with 
                                                           
8 The collapse of the peso in 1994 led to a 119 percent increase in the cost of type A meters, and 204 percent for 
type B. As a result, the 1995 target for installing meters was reduced from 586,700 to 219,300. The plan was to 
  32that in developed countries.  
 
According to CADF, metering promoted water conservation. This view is confirmed by the fact 
that there have been no serious interruptions to the service, even though the City has not had new 
sources of water from 1995. The programmes on metering and leak detection and repair have 
saved substantial volumes of water. However, in spite of this progress, more than 200,000 people 
in Mexico City still do not have access to water, and an unknown number, especially in the 
boroughs of Tlalpan and Iztapalapa, receive an intermittent service (Haggarty, et al., 2001, in 
Marañón, 2004).  
 
Complete metering would require the installation of about 400,000 additional meters, which had 
not been possible because of issues such as the difficulties in gaining access to isolated and 
remote areas, and refusal of some users to have meters. Consequently, CADF believed that a 
certain number of connections would never be metered. The coverage target has, therefore, been 
set at 95 percent, which means installing some 100,000 meters between 2002 and 2006. This is 
in addition to those that will have to be installed because of the natural growth of the City. 
 
CADF paid special attention to 16, 050 main non-domestic consumers, representing 0.9 percent 
of the total users but accounting for 46 percent of the total revenue. The major consumers were 
managed by CADF itself, including meter-reading and billing. CADF planed to make this 
process more efficient by introducing remote meter-reading. If so, its revenue from the major 
users would increase to 60 percent of its total income. The investment requirements for 
modernising the metering system of the major users can be recovered within one year.   
 
With increasing number of meters in use, their proper operation and maintenance had to receive 
priority attention. Accordingly, the work done by the contractors needs proper monitoring. 
Between 2001 and July 2003, the annual maintenance costs for 194,300 meters was estimated at 
$7 million per year. These costs were recovered from the users and, according to the CADF, the 
benefits outweighed the costs.  
 
Detection and repair of leaks 
 
In 1998, a major programme was initiated for detection and repair of leaks in the outdated 
secondary network. It is claimed that this programme saved 2.8 m
3/s of water, which provided 
benefits to nearly 1.2 million people at an investment cost of $185 million. Government critics, 
however, argue that the actual water savings were much less than what claimed officially. The 
critics argue that there was no overall saving because, although the leaks were repaired in certain 
areas, the pipes fractured further down the line because of increased water pressure, thus 




There was a charge for supply of water and for the right to discharge effluents to the sewerage 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
install both velocity and volumetric meters. The mechanism used for velocity meters (type B) made them more 
resistant to the suspended solids compared to those of type A. The type B meters were cheaper and the original aim 
was to install them in areas where the recovery of the investment may be problematic. (SF, 1997:60). 
  33system. Fines were imposed for late and overdue payments. The value-added tax (VAT) was 
charged to non-domestic users.  
 
Bill collection improved by 70.5 percent between 1992 and 2001, in spite of the fact that tariffs 
had fallen in real terms since 1996 (Haggarty et al., 2001; Saade, 2002, in Marañón, 2004) 
(Table 10). Debt recovery from the consumers has been difficult because of a culture of non-
payment of the bimonthly bills. While some users cannot afford to pay, some others simply 
refuse to pay. This culture of non-payment has developed because, historically, bill collection 
was mostly neglected by the water authorities. Traditional methods of debt-collection, which are 
very expensive, are being replaced gradually by new mechanisms which may be more cost-
effective. These include follow-up reminders to pay the debts, and instalment plans.  
 
 
Table 10. Bill collection efficiency, Mexico City, 1992-2002 
 
Amount recovered (million pesos)  Year 
Nominal  In real terms   
(base: 1990) 
Index (1990=100) 
1992 471.0  354.2  100.0 
1993 572.0  398.3  112.4 
1994 712.0  463.1  130.7 
1995 769.0  329.1  92.9 
1996 1,080.0  362.0  102.2 
1997 1,508.3  436.8  123.3 
1998 2,053.5  501.4  141.6 
1999 2,505.0  544.6  153.7 
2000 2,788.4  556.3  157.1 
2001 3,159.9  603.9  170.5 
2002 3,000.0  551.3  155.7 
        Source: CADF, 2002.  
 
 
After all these developments, meters were installed in 72 percent of households. However, this 
figure increases to 90 percent if a large number of apartment buildings are included where only 
the total consumption of the entire buildings is measured. Fixed charges are still used for 





The efficiency of the water system has improved considerably from 1996 (see Table 11). 
Between 1996 and 2002, efficiency of water supply has increased from 62.6 to 68.9 percent; 
monitoring efficiency in terms of measuring water consumption has increased from 49.1 to 90.2 
percent; and collection efficiency has improved from 64.8 to 76.9 percent. Overall efficiency 
(measured as a product of the three indicators mentioned) increased from 19.9 to 47.8 percent. 
This is in contrast to the situation that prevailed during the late 1980s, where the corresponding 
efficiency was around 10 percent (Beristain, 2002). 
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Participation of the private sector has had many benefits which include obtaining basic 
information on the system in terms of the networks and users, metering, higher revenues, and 
reduction in water consumption and unaccounted for water. Metering has promoted a culture of 
savings in both high and low-income households, and the leak detection and repair programme 
has led to the recovery of 2.8 m
3/s of water (Rodarte, 2002 in Marañón, 2004). However, the 
overall efficiency of the system has been approximately 50 percent, which means that only half 
of the investment cost has been recovered. Annual subsidies amount to some $2 billion dollars, 
which suggests that tariffs may have to be increased (Saade, 2002 in Marañón, 2004). 
 
Rodarte (2002, in Marañon, 2004) emphasises that a sustained increase in water tariffs is not 
possible in Mexico City, since 72 percent of the population are poor. When the PRI was the party 
in power, the population of the City was under the impression that water was a public service 
that would be provided by the State at a highly subsidised rate. PRI was against any efforts to 
privatise the service. This philosophy was further strengthened when PRD was elected, because 
its main power base constituted the overwhelming support of the City’s poor. 
 
Societal opinion  
 
The perceptions of the people interviewed in the boroughs of Coyoacán, Tlalpan and 
Xochimilco, were contradictory regarding the impacts of the participation of the private sector. 
People felt that the newly established offices have made it easier to pay bills, receive responses 
to inquiries on issues like overcharging, make applications for connections and disconnections, 
register changes in property ownership, and complain on poor quality service or lack of adequate 
attention from CADF personnel. This means that the contractors set up an up-to-date information 
system which simply did not exist before. At least one office was established for every 300,000 
users, and, for monitoring purposes, offices were opened in each neighbourhood so that users’ 
data could be checked in situ.  
 




Table 11: Efficiency indicators, Mexico City, 1996-2002 
 
 1996  1997  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002 
  Physical
1 62.6 63.0  64.5 66.3 68.0  69.2  68.9 
  Metering
2 49.1 80.0  86.0 88.5 90.3  90.1  90.2 
  Billing
3 64.8 63.5  76.0 81.7 79.3  83.1  76.9 
  Overall efficiency  19.9  32.0  42.1  47.9  48.7  51.8  47.8 
  Volume of water supplied (MCM)  686.6  690.6  691.9  720.2  752.8  752.2  757.5 
  Volume of water produced (MCM)   1,096.9  1,096.1  1,072.8  1,086.3  1,107.0  1,087.0  1,100.0 
   Number of users billed (10
3) 1,477.5  1,620.2  1,644.0  1,681.1  1,720.0  1,769.1  n.d 
   Meters installed  (10
3) 737.2  1,051.6  1,137.3  1,187.1  1,228.6  1,255.9  n.d 
  Number of bills based on meter- 
  reading  (10
3) 
725.6 1,260.6 1,408.3  1,505.1  1,552.8  1,582.7  1,590.0 
  Numbers of bills issued  (10
3) 1,478.2  1,575.7  1,637.6  1,701.2  1,720.0  1,756.0  1,800.0 
  Amount billed (million dollars)  224.5  306.5  328.5  306.3  368.8  388.9  425.7 
  Amount collected (million dollars)  145.3  191.5  255.5  247.0  295.0  327.5  327.5 
Source: CADF, 2002, internal reports. 
Notes: 
     
1 Volume of water delivered/Volume of water produced 
     
2 Number of bills for metered service/Number of bills issued  
     




      
Initially, bills based on meter readings of actual consumptions created general ill-feeling, 
especially in the poor areas. To a great extent this was because the users perceived the higher 
bills as an increase in tariffs, rather than an introduction of a consumption-based pricing system. 
There were demands for tariff reduction and service improvement, as well as claims for 
overcharging. In some housing estates, residents even prevented the installation of meters.  
 
In terms of overall service received, the general perception was negative, especially in the areas 
where supply was intermittent. It appeared that there were many more such areas than had been 
officially recognised.
9 The timing and duration of the supply in such areas varied widely. The 
supply could be once every three, four, or six days, or even once a fortnight, and for only two to 
three hours each time. Intermittent supplies dominated in poor outlying areas, squatter 
settlements, or high-altitude zones because of low pressure. The people living in such areas 
complained about the inequality in water distribution, and opposed the metering system because 
they felt that they were being charged for the air that was passing through the metres and not for 
the water consumed. People argued that they should pay a fixed charge for water and not a bill 
for actual consumption, as was the case. Haggarty et al. (2001 in Marañón, 2004) emphasize that 
the problems related to poor service persist, including poor quality of water and intermittent 
service, particularly in the south and east parts of the City. It should be noted that the reliability 
of the service remained the responsibility of the boroughs authorities, not the private sector 
companies. 
 
In 1998, residents of the nine of the 16 boroughs suffered routine reductions in service, and the 
severity of the problems and the number of people affected varied considerably. Water quality in 
these areas was perceived to be extremely poor, probably because groundwater contained high 
concentrations of magnesium, and because the southeasten part of the City is the last to receive 
water that comes from the Cutzamala System. 
 
Another factor worth noting is that the people, irrespective of their social class and background, 
were unaware of the private sector involvement in managing the service. Those interviewed felt 
that the service had improved but they had no idea that this was because of the participation of 
the private sector. Considering the high degree of politicisation of the population of Mexico City, 
the authorities probably decided not to have a public debate on this issue, and thus did not inform 
the population of the roles of the private sector, fearing perhaps that such knowledge might lead 
to widespread protests (Hiernaux-Nicolas, 2002 in Marañon, 2004). 
 
Institutional arrangements in Mexico City since the mid-1990s have included the participation of 
the private sector through service contracts, but with the government maintaining control over 
property rights over infrastructure, responsibility for provision of the service, and authority to fix 
tariffs (Martínez-Omaña, 2002). The government did delegate certain basic responsibilities to the 
companies, including meter installation and reading, billing, preparation ad updating of the 
registers of users and establishment and management of the offices for dealing with the public. 
However, the companies perform these services in the name of CADF, and not in their own 
                                                           
9 According to borough officials responsible for water provision, a greater percentage of the population receives 
intermittent service than admitted by the then operational arm of CADF, DGCOH. The DGCOH, in assigning a 
volume for a specific zone, assumes that all its residents receive water. However, once the water reaches a 
neighbourhood, pressure is sufficient only to supply water to a fraction of all households. 
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unaware of the private sector involvement.  
 
CADF was established as the sole authority in charge of water management in the Mexico City, 
coordinating the roles of DGCOH and the borough authorities with private sector support. 
However, this did not happen. Until 2002, CADF managed the contracts with the companies and 
supervised the activities assigned to the private sector, mainly in the commercial area. DGCOH 
continued to be responsible for expanding the services in terms of infrastructure, access to water, 
and operating the primary networks. The borough authorities were responsible for maintaining 
water and sewerage networks, repairing connections, maintaining pipelines, and administering 
intermittent supplies in areas of water shortages.  
 
The new strategy made no attempt to change the bureaucratic and hierarchical structure of the 
water administration, with highly centralised decision-making, no public participation and 
abundance of red tape. The net result has been a substantial gap between the consumers and the 
authorities in the perception of the social and geographical realities, especially where water is in 
short supply. Efforts have been made to bridge this gap through the work of representatives of 
the consumers whose tasks include aggregating the views and demands of the residents, though 
some of them have their own personal agendas (Treviño, 1999; Avila, 2003, in Marañón, 2004). 
The distance between the two sides and the absence of communication simply adds to the 
ignorance of the consumers on the nature of the current institutional arrangements. The popular 
view is that the authorities are divided into groups: one represented by CADF, responsible for 
commercial aspects like metering, billing and collection; and second, the borough authorities, in 
charge of the distribution of water, management of service interruptions, and leak repairs, and 
who are always being criticised for shortages. This view corresponds to the reality in the sense 
that there were different institutions involved in water management. It was not until 2002 that a 
new body was created: the Mexico City Water System (Sistema de Aguas de la Ciudad de 
México) to be responsible for the overall water management in the City by merging CADF and 




Uncertainty surrounded the future of the private sector participation as the contracts drew to a 
close in August 2003. The companies received no information from the City authorities as to 
their involvement in terms of their future participation. At the end of 2003, both the sides were 
negotiating a new agreement that seemed to respond to the general concerns. The government 
was seeking to maintain the participation of the private sector for the tasks already assigned, but 
was offering lower rates for each task. It was also proposing to give itself authority to cut off 
services to the commercial and industrial customers whose payments were overdue, as well as 
take steps to recharge the aquifer. Finally, responsibility for the water supply was to remain in 
public hands with the private sector continuing to participate in specific areas.  
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City. Since all decision-making depends now on one institution instead of several, coordination 
within the institutions, as well as coordination with the private sector companies could improve 
with time, resulting in a better overall performance to the benefit of the City and its population. 
Only time will tell if these expectations will be achieved. 
 
 
WATER AS A HUMAN RIGHT 
 
For nearly a half century, the human rights movement has tried to expand the areas which can be 
considered to be human rights. The movement has tried to interpret and reinterpret existing 
international conventions and treaties to expand the concepts of rights to additional areas, where 
according to prevailing international agreements, no specific rights currently exist: water as a 
human right appears to be the results of such an approach.   
 
While there is no direct international convention that stipulates categorically and unambiguously 
that water is a human right, since water is a basic requirement for survival, many international 
conventions refer it to its importance in one form or another. A significant part of the discussions 
on water as a human right are somewhat diffused. 
 
The two most important agreements, which could lead to the possible acceptance of the concept 
that water is a human right are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (both available at 
www.unhcr.org). Both of these Covenants refer to water but do not stipulate clearly that water is 
in fact a human right. 
 
The United Nations established two committees to oversee the implementation of these two 
covenants. The Committee of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), which is 
responsible for overseeing the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, is probably 
the most important legal consideration in this area. This Committee issued a General Comment 
(No. 15), which interpreted articles 11 and 12 of the Covenant, and concluded that water is a 
human right under this Covenant, and some other international legal agreements can be 
interpreted as promoting this concept (Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
2002). 
 
In Art. 17, the General Comment No. 15 states that:    
 
“State parties have immediate obligations in relation to the right to water, such as the 
guarantee that will be exercised without discrimination of any kind and the obligation to 
take steps forwards full realization ….Such steps must be deliberate, concrete and 
targeted towards the full realization of the right to water.” 
 
In other words, water as a human right has not been established through an international treaty 
that has been ratified by the governments, but primarily through derivation and inference of 
existing legal conventions.  
 
The General Comment 15 almost exclusively considers human right to water for human 
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(right to adequate food) and ensure environmental hygiene (right to health). Water is essential for 
securing livelihoods (right to gain a living by work) and enjoying certain cultural practices (right 
to take part in cultural life).” Subsequently, other water uses and the associated rights are 
basically ignored, because CESCR concluded that priorities “must be” given to personal and 
domestic uses, and “should be” given to use of water to prevent starvation and diseases. In other 
words, CESCR seem to allocate priorities in terms of rights, first to domestic water supply, then 
to health. The Committee evidently did not consider other water uses as priority issues under 
human rights considerations. Many experts are likely to disagree with this interpretation.   
 
In Mexico, the governmental institutions as well as the NGOs and the population in general have 
accepted that clean water and sanitation should be provided to all its citizens. However, this issue 
was accepted well before water was considered to be a human right. The declaration of water as 
a human right does not appear to have made any perceptible difference to the water supply and 
sanitation policies, plans and programmes of the water institutions of the Mexican government at 
any level. 
 
In Mexico City, the campaign to disseminate information on the economic, social, cultural and 
environmental rights of the people, including the right to water, was initially started by “DECA 
Equipo Pueblo, A.C.”
10 This organisation, a NGO, in collaboration with the Human Rights 
Commission of Mexico City and a large number of mostly local NGOs, has campaigned and 
disseminated information on the various issues related to human rights from 2003.  
 
During a public meeting in Mexico City downtown, in December 2004, a poll was conducted to 
discern the opinions of the citizens on water quantity and quality issues, as well as other 
important issues in this area. Only about 150 people were interviewed. Most of them agreed that 
they enjoy the right to receive potable water, and that they receive all the water they need at an 
affordable price, and of appropriate quality. The overall service was considered good and water 
management in the City was considered to be mostly a responsibility of the local and federal 
governments, and, in very few cases, also as a responsibility of the citizens. A large majority 




The results of this poll do not reflect accurately the enormous and increasing problems the 
people face on a daily basis in terms of water quality and quality. It is likely that the sample was 
not representative, and/or the respondents were polite and they did not express their actual views. 
However, the results of this poll are included because it is only such effort that has been carried 
out in the ZMCM.  
 
DECA Equipo Pueblo, A.C., has also compiled a series of documents that analyse the economic, 
social and cultural rights for the people, both from the national and international perspectives. 
This includes the Mexican Constitution on what the group consider refer to human rights (Annex 
II).  
 
                                                           
10 Information on these activities are available at www.derechoalagua.org 
11 The results of this opinion poll are attached as Annex I. 
  39While the activities of the NGOs and many others working in this area are very important, it has 
to be acknowledged that there seems to be a discrepancy between the perspectives of the 
government and the NGOs regarding water as a human right. It appears that NGOs feel that if 
water is considered as a human right, it will automatically “assure” poor, scattered and illegal 
settlements access to clean water and sanitation. However, the various levels of governments 
have attempted to provide these services, admittedly sometimes inadequate, even before the 
movement of water as a human right started, because they have considered these services to be 
basic needs of the people and should be satisfied. For example, irrespective of whether 
households pay for their water bills or not, legally water supply cannot be cut, since people must 
receive a minimum amount of water on daily basis.   
 
If the issue of water as a human right is to be acknowledged by the society as a whole, and there 
are practical implications on this recognition, then there is an urgent need to disseminate 
information on this issue. The fact that no government has signed a specific international 
agreement which stipulates that water is a human right, and that this right is inferred by an UN 
Committee based on the earlier covenants, have meant that its awareness in the government 





Based on the analysis presented in this report, it is evident that the management of water 
resources in the ZMCM is very complex. There appears to be an uneven race between the water 
and sanitation needs of an increasing population, and the planning, investments, technology and 
management needs required to construct, operate and maintain all the necessary systems 
efficiently. 
  
The problems of water quantity and quality in the ZMCM are multidimensional and are directly 
linked to the societal expectations, regional economic development policies and steady increases 
in population. The government policies have attempted to promote the development of other 
urban centres to alleviate poverty and to provide improved standards of living as well as quality 
of life. However, even though the population growth rate in Mexico City during the later part of 
the 20
th century has declined compared to the rates witnessed in the earlier decades, the growth 
rates in the adjacent municipalities of the State of Mexico that are part of the metropolitan area 
are expected to increase even further. Accordingly, the problem is likely to remain complex in 
the foreseeable future. Unless the current trends and management practices change, the future 
solutions will require very high investment costs to transport more and more water from 
increasingly distant and expensive sources which also have important economic, social and 
environmental implications for the exporting regions, higher land subsidence rates due to ever-
increasing groundwater withdrawals, reduction in the quality of the groundwater extracted, and 
higher investments to cover operation and maintenance costs, not to mention the decreasing 
quality of life of the population living in the region. 
 
One constraint stems from the fact that the demand for living spaces from the continually 
increasing population has contributed to major changes in land use practices. Concrete and 
asphalt now cover areas that are needed for groundwater recharge. The southern area of the City 
is a good recharge area since the soil is broken basalt. However, this area is now heavily 
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the absence of a sewerage network which cannot be economically constructed due to the 
presence of volcanic rocks. Housing complexes are thus built only with septic tanks that are not 
properly constructed and maintained and, therefore contribute to groundwater pollution.  
 
Changes in land use have also contributed to higher volumes of stormwater discharges to the 
sewerage system, requiring increasing capacities of the system. The risk of aquifer contamination 
is enhanced because of disposal of untreated industrial wastewaters directly into the sewerage 
system, inadequate wastewater treatment facilities, leakages from the sewerage networks, and 
solid waste illegally dumped in landfills, unlined sewerage canals and watercourses.  
 
There have been evidences of low water quality in the aquifer for several years (Mazari-Hiriart et 
al., 2001, 2000 and 1999; Mazari-Hiriart and Noyola 2000 in Mazari-Hiriart, 2001; UNAM, 
1997; National Research Council et al., 1995). Total and faecal coliforms, as well as bacteria 
responsible for gastroenteric diseases and acute diarrhoeas, have been found in groundwater in 
the southern and western parts of the City. Some studies show that the highest contamination of 
groundwater is in the centre of the Mexico City (Soto et al., 2000 in Mazari-Hiriart, 2001).  The 
gastro-enteric diseases which result from the consumption of polluted water are the second major 
cause for child mortality (278 per 100,000) in the country; the third leading cause of death for 
children in the State of Mexico (450 per 100,000); and the fourth in Mexico City (157 per 
100,000).  
 
A major constraint to analyse water problems of the ZMCM, or any part of Mexico for that 
matter, is that of data reliability and accessibility. Official data are often inconsistent, which is a 
major constraint for decision-making, since decisions have to be taken based on conflicting, or 
no information. Public have very limited access to information available at the institutions which 
is often contradictory from one year to another, from one location to another, or even from the 
same source.  
 
It is obvious that the present approach to the management of the water supply and wastewater in 
the metropolitan area is neither efficient and equitable nor sustainable. In order to fulfil the needs 
of an expanding population in terms of water quantity and quality, and to simultaneously 
maintain a proper balance between the people, natural resources, environment and health, it is 
necessary to formulate and implement a long-term integrated management plan, which does not 
exist at present. This should explicitly consider the needs and interests of the different economic 
sectors in both Mexico City and State of Mexico, and also the numerous existing inefficiencies in 
management can be overcome. Water allocations for the different consumers need to be 
systematically planned and be better organised. More efficient institutional arrangements and 
coordination between the governments of both the regions of ZMCM are essential. Joint and 
more efficient institutional mechanisms are needed to substantially improve the exiting practices. 
The relevance and importance of public consultations and involvements in preparing and 
implementing such plans should not be underestimated. Such stakeholders´ consultations are 
now conspicuous by their absence. 
 
The participation of the private sector in the provision of potable water has so far been beneficial 
for the City, even though it has not had any impacts on whether certain areas receive potable 
water or not. This is because the policies and decisions on water and sanitation services continue, 
  41and are expected to continue, being the exclusive responsibility of the government. 
 
The current policies on tariff structures need to be reassessed. At present, there is one tariff, 
based on the volume of water consumed, for the great majority of the people, irrespective of their 
socio-economic status, or the place where they live. Since a poor family can have 10 people 
living in the same house, they often pay more than a rich family of 2-4 persons. A new, realistic 
and equitable tariff structure needs to be developed which will promote water conservation, 
improve the financial self-sufficiency of the water institutions, and explicitly consider access to 
water by the poor, perhaps with targeted subsidies.  
 
Finally, there is no doubt that there is an enormous room for improvement in the existing and 
proposed practices for water management in the Metropolitan Area of Mexico City. However, a 
policy that considers exclusively the water sector is unlikely to be successful. It needs to 
concurrently consider linkages to policies on urban development (so far an issue that has been 
ignored), migration, industry, energy and environment. It will not be an easy task, but 
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